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We present a quantum key distribution protocol based on four-level particle entanglement. Furthermore, a controlled quantum key 
distribution protocol is proposed using three four-level particles. We show that the two protocols are secure. 
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most impor-
tant branches of quantum cryptography, and plays an im-
portant role in perfectly secure communication between two 
parties. In classic cryptography, there is nothing to prevent 
an eavesdropper from monitoring the key distribution 
channel without being detected by legitimate users. In 
quantum cryptography, the principle of quantum mechanics 
was introduced to ensure the security of the key distribution 
channel. Since the seminal work of Bennett and Brassard 
[1], quantum cryptography has developed quickly [2–19]. 
Using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) [20] correlations, 
Ekert [3] suggested a QKD protocol, in which one can cer-
tify that the particles of EPR pairs are safely transmitted in 
the quantum channel using Bell’s theorem [21]. In 1992, 
Bennett et al. [4] proposed a simpler EPR protocol without 
invoking Bell’s theorem. Long et al. [6] put forward a QKD 
protocol using the block transmission method to ensure the 
security of the key distribution channel. 
In this paper, we suggest a QKD protocol based on four- 
level particle entanglement. Then a controlled quantum key 
distribution protocol is proposed using three entangled 
four-level particles as the quantum key distribution channel. 
The security of the key distribution channels is guaranteed 
using the block transmission method proposed by Long et 
al. [6]. 
                      
*Corresponding author (email: flyan@hebtu.edu.cn) 
1  A quantum key distribution protocol using 
two entangled four-level particles as the quantum 
channel 
Suppose that two legitimate correspondents, Alice and Bob, 
share a number of the following entangled quantum states:  
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which is also called the quantum channel. Here the 
four-level particles A and B belong to Alice and Bob, re-
spectively; the states | i〉  (i=0, 1, 2, 3) stand for the four 
eigenstates of the four-level particles A and B; the states 
|φ± 〉 , |ψ ± 〉  are well defined as  
1 1( ), ( ),
2 2






= + = −0 3 0 3
〉 = 〉+ 〉 〉 = 〉− 〉　
    (2) 
Obviously, the states in eq. (2) are orthogonal to each other 
and constitute a basis of four-dimensional Hilbert space. 
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Obtaining a number of state | ABχ〉  could have come 
about in many different ways. For example, Alice could 
prepare the pairs and then send half of each to Bob, or vice 
versa. Alternatively, a third party could prepare the pairs 
and send the halves to Alice and Bob. Or, they could have 
met some time ago and shared them, storing them until the 
present. 
We introduce the following operators: 
,3 0 0 3 1 2 2 1
,0 0 3 32 2 1 1
,3 3 0 01 1 2 2









= + + +
= + + +
= + − −
= + − −
          (3) 
Clearly, σx, vx, σz, vz are Hermitian operators and  
2 2 2 2 .x x z zv v Iσ σ= = = =                (4) 
Here I is an identity operator in four-dimensional Hilbert 
space. Thus the eigenvalues of the operators σx, vx, σz, vz 
can only be 1 or –1.  
It is easy to prove that  
,A Bx x AB ABσ σ χ χ⊗ = −              (5.1) 
,A Bx x AB ABv v χ χ⊗ = −               (5.2) 
,A Bz z AB ABσ σ χ χ⊗ = −              (5.3) 
.A Bz z AB ABv v χ χ⊗ =                (5.4) 
Next we will show that if a quantum state | ABEΨ 〉  satisfies  
,A Bx x ABE ABEσ σ Ψ Ψ⊗ = −             (6.1) 
,A Bx x ABE ABEv v Ψ Ψ⊗ = −             (6.2) 
,A Bz z ABE ABEσ σ Ψ Ψ⊗ = −            (6.3) 
,A Bz z ABE ABEv v Ψ Ψ⊗ =             (6.4) 
then the quantum state | | |ABE AB EΨ χ α〉 = 〉 〉 . Here E de-
notes the environment of the system consisting of particles 
A and B; | Eα〉  is the quantum state of the environment. Of 
course, the eavesdropper is included in the environment. 
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where | ,i Eα 〉  i=1, 2,…16, stand for the un-normalized 
quantum states of the environment. 
By considering eq. (6.1) we obtain 
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| | , | | .
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〉 = − 〉 〉 = − 〉
      (8) 
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Substituting eq. (9) into eq. (6.2), we have 
1 6 2 5
3 8 4 7
| | , | | ,
| | , | | .
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| (| 00 | 33 |11 | 22 ) |
(| 01 | 32 |10 | 23 ) |
(| 02 | 31 |13 | 20 ) |
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Using eq. (6.3) we can obtain 
1 3| 0, | 0.E Eα α〉 = 〉 =            (12) 
This leads to 
2
4
| (| 01 | 32 |10 | 23 ) |





〉 = 〉− 〉+ 〉− 〉 〉
+ 〉− 〉+ 〉− 〉 〉  
Since the quantum state | ABEΨ 〉  should satisfy eq. (6.4), 
there must be  
4| 0.Eα 〉 =                   (14) 
Thus we arrive at the conclusion, which is 
2| (| 01 | 32 |10 | 23 ) | .ABE AB EΨ α〉 = 〉− 〉+ 〉− 〉 〉      (15) 
As a matter of fact, | ABEΨ 〉  is just the quantum state 
| |AB Eχ α〉 〉 . This means the proof has been completed. 
The above result indicates that when the quantum state 
satisfies eq. (6), it must be | |AB Eχ α〉 〉 . This means that the 
quantum channel shared by Alice and Bob is entirely un-
correlated with the eavesdropper. Thus it is impossible for 
the eavesdropper to obtain the secret key. 
Therefore, the legitimate correspondents, Alice and Bob 
can check whether the quantum channel is | ABχ〉 . Each of 
them randomly chooses the operators σx, vx, σz, vz to measure 
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the entangled states they shared. After a series of the entan-
gled states have been measured, Alice and Bob announce 
the operators and the measurement outcomes. If eq. (6) is 
satisfied by all measurement outcomes, then the quantum 
channel is the entangled quantum state | ABχ〉 . This means 
that the quantum channel shared by Alice and Bob is secure. 
If an eavesdropper wants to obtain the secret key between 
Alice and Bob, he/she must entangle his/her qubits with the 
particles A and B. In this case, the measurement outcomes 
of Alice and Bob cannot satisfy eq. (6) exactly. Thus the 
eavesdropper will be found easily, and Alice and Bob will 
restart the protocol. 
It should be noted that Alice and Bob need to authenti-
cate each other before the protocol and trust authenticated 
classical messages are received from each other in the pro-
tocol. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot behave as Alice 
or Bob in the eavesdropping procedure. 
If the quantum channel is secure, then the two corre-
spondents, Alice and Bob could use it to distribute quantum 
keys by the following steps: 
(i) Alice and Bob measure their respective particles A, B 
on the same basis as defined in eq. (2). 
(ii) The quantum channel | ABχ〉  shared by Alice and 
Bob would read 
_1| (| | | |
2
| | | | ) .                 (16)
AB
AB
χ ψ ϕ ϕ ψ
ψ ϕ ϕ ψ
− + +
+ − + −
〉 = 〉 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉　
 
In eq. (16), the four states _{| ,| ,| ,| }φ φ ψ ψ+ + −〉 〉 〉 〉  would 
be coded into two bits of classical information as they are 
orthogonal to each other. One bit would be used to discrimi-
nate the states |φ〉  or |ψ 〉  which we call a parity bit, and 
the other bit would be used to discriminate the superscripts of 
the states |φ± 〉  or |ψ ± 〉  which we call a phase bit. 
(iii) From a series of measurement results, they randomly 
choose some to reexamine the security of the quantum 
channel. If their results are well correlated, then the quan-
tum channel can be considered secure. Otherwise, they 
should restart the protocol. 
(iv) If the quantum channel is secure by the above ex-
amination, we could use the parity bit and the phase bit of 
the measurement results as the secret key. 
So far, a secret key has been set up between the two cor-
respondents using the entangled four-level particles. The 
security of the protocol is based on the laws of physics. 
2  A controlled quantum key distribution   
protocol using three four-level particles 
Assume that the controller Alice, and the two correspondents, 
Bob and Charlie, share a quantum channel consisting of a 
number of the three entangled four-level particles 
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| | | | ) ].                       (17)
A
BC
ψ ψ φ φ ψ
ψ φ φ ψ
− − + − +
+ − + −
+ 〉 〉 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉
 
Here the four-level particles A, B and C belong to Alice, 
Bob and Charlie, respectively. 
Now we introduce another two measurement operators:  
| 2 3 | | 3 2 | | 0 1| |1 0 |,
| 3 3 | |1 1 | | 0 0 | | 2 2 | .
x
zo
ε = 〉〈 + 〉〈 + 〉〈 + 〉〈
= 〉〈 − 〉〈 + 〉〈 + 〉〈        (18) 
It is easy to prove that εx, oz are Hermitian operators and 
2 2 .x zo Iε = =                  (19) 
Therefore, the eigenvalues of the operators εx, oz are 1 or 
–1. 






x x x ABC ABC
A B C
z z z ABC ABC
A B C
x x ABC ABC
A B C




σ σ σ χ χ
χ χ
ε ε χ χ
ε ε χ χ
⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉
⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉
⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉
⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉
        (20) 
Next, we will prove that if | ABCEψ 〉  satisfies the fol-
lowing equation:  
| | ,A B Cx x x ABCE ABCEσ σ σ ψ ψ⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉        (21.1) 
| | ,A B Cz z z ABCE ABCEo o o ψ ψ⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉          (21.2) 
| | ,A B Cx x ABCE ABCEIε ε ψ ψ⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉         (21.3) 
| | ,A B Cx x ABCE ABCEI ε ε ψ ψ⊗ ⊗ 〉 = 〉         (21.4) 
then | | |ABCE ABC Eψ χ β〉 = 〉 〉  holds. Here E still stands for 
the environment. 
The general formation of the quantum state of the three 
four-level particles and the environment should be 







| | 000 | | 001 | | 002 |
| 003 | | 010 | | 011 |
| 012 | | 013 | | 020 |
| 021 | | 022 | | 023 |
| 030 | | 031 | | 032 |
| 033 |
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| 210 | | 211 | | 212 |
| 213 | | 220 | | 221 |
| 222 | | 223 | | 230 |
| 231 | | 232 | | 233 |
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| | 302 |
| 303 | | 310 | | 311 |
| 312 | | 313 | | 320 |
| 321 | | 322 | | 323 |
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〉 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉+ 〉 〉
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+ 〉 〉
 
Here | ,iβ 〉  i=000, 001,…,333, are the states of the envi-
ronment; | ,klm〉 k, l, m =0, 1, 2, 3, denote the states of the 
three four-level particles A, B, C. 
According to eq. (21.1), we have 
000 333 001 332 002 331
003 330 010 323 011 322
012 321 013 320 020 313
021 312 022 311 023 310
030 303 031 302 03
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | | , |
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 2 301
033 300 100 233 101 232
102 231 103 230 110 223
111 222 112 221 113 220
120 213 121 212 122 211
123 210 130
| ,
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | | , | | ,
| | , | |
β
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β
〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 203 131 202
132 201 133 200
, | | ,
| | , | | .
β β β
β β β β
〉 〉 = 〉
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉
   (23) 





| (| 000 | 333 ) | (| 001 | 332 ) |
(| 002 | 331 ) | (| 003 | 330 ) |
(| 010 | 323 ) | (| 011 | 322 ) |





〉 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
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(| 020 | 313 ) | (| 021 | 312 ) |
(| 022 | 311 ) | (| 023 | 310 ) |
(| 030 | 303 ) | (| 031 | 302 ) |
(| 032 | 301 ) | (| 033 | 300 ) |
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(|102 | 231 ) | (|103 | 230 ) |
(|110 | 223 ) | (|111 | 222 ) |
(|112 | 221 ) | (|113 | 220 ) |
(|120 | 213 ) | (|121 | 212 ) |
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+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
130 131
132 133
(|130 | 203 ) | (|131 | 202 ) |
(|132 | 201 ) | (|133 | 200 ) | . (24)
β β
β β
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
 
Substituting it into eq. (21.2), we obtain 













| | | 0.                    (25)
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= 〉 = 〉 = 〉
= 〉 = 〉 = 〉 =
 






| (| 000 | 333 ) | (| 003 | 330 ) |
(| 011 | 322 ) | (| 022 | 311 ) |
(| 030 | 303 ) | (| 033 | 300 ) |
(|101 | 232 ) | (|110 | 223 ) |






〉 = 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉 〉 + 〉+ 〉 131) | . (26)β 〉
 
By the restriction of eq. (21.3), we obtain 
000 110 003 113 011 101
022 030 033 131
| | , | | , | | ,
| | | | 0.
β β β β β β
β β β β
〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉 〉 = 〉





| (|110 | 223 | 000 | 333 ) |
               (|113 | 220 | 003 | 330 ) |




〉 = 〉+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉 〉
+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉 〉
 
Eq. (21.4) further restricts | ABCEψ 〉  to be of the form 
000
| (|110 | 223 | 000 | 333
               |101 | 232 | 011 | 322 ) |






〉 = 〉+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉
+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉+ 〉 〉
= 〉 〉
 
Thus the proof has been completed. 
Based on the conclusion above, Alice, Bob and Charlie 
can check whether the quantum channel is | ABCχ〉 . Each of 
them randomly selects the operators σx, εx, oz and I to 
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measure the entangled states they share. After many of the 
entangled states have been measured, Alice, Bob and Char-
lie publish the operators and the measurement outcomes. If 
eq. (21) is satisfied by all the measurement outcomes, then 
the quantum channel is the entangled quantum state 
| ABCχ〉 , meaning that the quantum channel shared by Alice, 
Bob and Charlie is entirely uncorrelated with the eaves-
dropper. If an eavesdropper is stealing the secret key be-
tween Alice and Bob, he/she must entangle his/her qubits 
with the particles A, B and C. Hence the quantum state of 
the particles A, B, C and E is not | |ABC Eχ β〉 〉 . In this case, 
the measurement outcomes of Alice, Bob and Charlie can 
not satisfy eq. (21) exactly, so the eavesdropper will easily 
be found. The legitimate users Alice, Bob and Charlie will 
restart the protocol. We assume that in the process of testing 
the security of the quantum channel, Alice, Bob and Charlie 
announce the true results. 
If the quantum channel is secure, then the two corre-
spondents, Bob and Charlie, can use it to distribute quantum 
keys controlled by Alice. The details are as follows: 
(i) Alice, Bob and Charlie measure the rest of their re-
spective particles A, B and C on the same basis as defined in 
eq. (2) and record the measurement results. 
(ii) Evidently, the measurement results are correlated 
according to eq. (17). Hence, the measurement result is a 
secret key shared by Alice, Bob and Charlie. If the control-
ler Alice permits Bob and Charlie to create a secret key, she 
should tell Bob and Charlie her measurement outcomes. 
With the message of Alice’s measurement outcomes and 
Bob’s measurement results, Bob can deduce Charlie’s 
measurement results. At the same time, with the message of 
Alice’s measurement outcomes and Charlie’s measurement 
results, Charlie can obtain Bob’s measurement results. Thus 
with Alice’s permission Bob and Charlie can create a secret 
key based on the measurement results. However, if Alice 
does not announce her measurement outcomes, there is no 
way for Bob and Charlie to create a secret key using the 
quantum channel | .ABCχ〉  This is just a controlled quan-
tum key distribution. In other words, the quantum key dis-
tribution between Bob and Charlie is controlled by Alice. In 
fact, this controlled quantum key distribution protocol is 
just a secret sharing protocol [22–25]. 
3  Conclusion 
We presented a quantum key distribution protocol based on 
four-level particle entanglement and described a controlled 
quantum key distribution protocol using three four-level 
particles. The security of the two protocols is guaranteed by 
the law of quantum physics.  
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